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1. Introduction
The European Union, with 27 members it is one of the largest and eco-
nomically most powerful unions on the globe.1 Unfortunately the efforts to
deepen the cooperation have been hampered by the complicated decision
making processes paralysed by safety measures to ensure that no group of
countries can be exploited by others. The Council of Ministers (CM) is the
main decision making body uses qualified majority voting with conditions on
the total (weighted) votes, the total population and the number of supporting
countries is met.
While the entire voting process has been subject to criticism, the first
condition is especially controversial. The weighted votes have been assigned
to express the differences in country sizes, but the actual weights are rather
arbitrary. While in 1958 Belgium and the Netherlands each had approxi-
mately 10 million inhabitants, and were thus treated equally, this remained
so until recently despite a difference of over 60% in current populations.
Such changes require the continuous updating of the voting weights keeping
member countries in a persistent debate.
The Treaty of Lisbon attempts to solve the two issues at once. The idea
was to remove the voting weights and create a voting system that is both
fair, simple and requires no adjustments should the EU accept new members
or should the populations change dramatically.
In this note we look at the effect of the voting reform on the individ-
ual countries’ influence on decision making both on the short and long term.
Our long term calculations are based on the population forecasts of Eurostat.
Ours is not the first to analyse the new voting system in the Council, but un-
like Felsenthal and Machover (2007), Turnovec (2008) or Barr and Passarelli
(2009) we look also at the long term effects using population estimates. Since
the voting rules under the Lisbon treaty are based on population data, voting
power is very sensitive to these values.
The Lisbon treaty changes the decision making in other aspects as well.
It gives a greater influence to the European Parliament (EP). The members
of the EP are elected from the member states – the number of members from
the individual countries are given by similar political decisions. We believe
that in the European Parliament the views are stratified according to the
1For a strategic analysis of the more recent extensions see Ko´czy (2010).
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political views of the members and national politics play a lesser role and
so our focus remained on the Council of Ministers. The recently proposed
Cambridge Compromise (Grimmett, 2011) studies the fair apportionment
of EP seats; Barthelemy and Martin (2011) look at the apportionment in
the US presidential elections. Similarly to us, these papers abstract away
from the political games and evaluate the power balance mathematically.
On the other hand, while the Cambridge Compromise formulates specific
recommendations our aim is merely to evaluate some of the changes in the
legislative process and highlight some, perhaps unintended effects.
The paper is then structured as follows. First we explain the voting rules
in the Council of Ministers before and after the Lisbon Treaty. Here we
also mention the Jagellonian Compromise an alternative proposal, a scien-
tific approach to design a fair rule that was widely supported by the aca-
demic community, but got little attention in the negotiations. We explain
the voting power approach, describe the data and the software we use for the
calculations and present the results together with some comments.
2. The voting reform
The Council of Ministers is the European Union’s main decision making
body. The Council consists of a single representative of each member state,
but when the votes are cast their weight might differ. This is different from
the weighted voting in, for instance, a national assembly, where the weights
are naturally provided by the number of representatives. The qualified ma-
jority voting used in the Council allows for flexible, some might say: arbitrary
rules on what are the winning coalitions. In the following we explain the rules
applied before and after the Reform Treaty.
2.1. Treaty of Nice
Under the Treaty of Nice a coalition of countries must satisfy all of the
following 3 conditions in order to be able to pass a decision:
• The coalition must consist of the majority2 of countries (where each
country has a single “vote”).
• The coalition must cast at least 74% of the votes.
2The required majority is 50% in most cases, with the exception when the Council is
not acting on a proposal of the Commission: such cases require a two-third majority.
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• The coalition must have at least 62% of the population.
Choosing the weights for the individual countries is not an easy task, the
Treaty of Nice was preceded by long negotiations. Leech (2002) gives a
detailed investigation of different extension scenarios including a discussion
on the significance of quotas, that is, the required majority. Felsenthal and
Machover (2001) argue that the quotas were simply set too high, paralysing
EU decision making.
2.2. Treaty of Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the artificial and much debated weighted
voting system and replaced it with one, based on population data. It has
also increased the role of the European Parliament in the decision making
process. Since voting in the EP is based on individual representatives that
form voting blocks not on a national, but on political/ideological base, here
we focus on voting in the Council of Ministers.
Under the new treaty the decision must be supported by a coalition of
countries that satisfies at least one of the following conditions:
• The majority of countries (55% or 72% in special cases) representing
at least 65% of the population, or
• No more than 3 countries are against the proposal.
Without the second condition any 3 of the 4 largest countries could, by
themselves block a proposal. While such divisions between the large and the
small members of the EU do not really occur, this condition was included as
a safeguard against a possible alliance of the largest members.
The Treaty specifies that until 31 October 2014 the Nice rules will be used.
After this date the new rules should be used, but “Between 1 November 2014
and 31 March 2017, when an act is to be adopted by qualified majority, a
member of the Council may request that it be adopted in accordance with the
qualified majority. . . ”3, in other words, according to the Nice rules. While
secondary sources (e.g. Mahony, 2007) cite this part of the treaty in a more
neutral tone: “the original sysyem [sic! ] under Nice can still be used to take
decisions if a member state thinks it necessary” the possibility only applies
3Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol on Transitional Provisions, Provisions concerning the qual-
ified majority, §3.2.
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to the adoption of an act and not to the rejection. Should it also apply to
the latter, we would be back to the Nice rules as in cases where there is a
difference there is always a voter on one of the sides who finds the old rules
more favourable.
number population votes
Nice –31 October 2014 50% 14 62% 74%
Transition
31 October 2014 50% 14 62% 74%
– 55% 15 65%
31 March 2017 n-3 24
Lisbon 31 March 2017–
55% 15 65%
n-3 24
Table 1: A comparison of voting rules
In sum, during the transition period an act can be approved by either of
the two systems.
2.3. The “Jagiellonian Compromise”
Penrose (1946) has shown that the one man-one vote idea of equity can
best be achieved in an international decision making body by giving each
voter a weight proportional to the square root of its population. This idea
was advocated in the case of the EU Council of Ministers by S lomczyn´ski and
Z˙yczkowski (2004, 2006) who proposed a quota of 62% as giving the most
equitable representation.
S lomczyn´ski and Z˙yczkowski (2004) argued that the proposal does not
ex ante favour any of the member states, its principles are clear and math-
ematically sound. The square-root model would give a scientific approach
that at the same time would provide effectiveness of 16.6%, that, as we will
see well exceeds the decisiveness of any of the previous models. In practice
this means that 1 out of 6 coalitions can make a decision. The proposal was
put forward as a “compromise,” as it gives a larger influence for the largest,
smaller influence for medium sized countries, but not to the extent of the Lis-
bon rules. On the other hand for many of the member states the square-root
model is actually the best and only Italy and Spain and, when we look at
the Banzhaf indices, some of the smallest countries would suffer under that
rule. It is therefore somewhat surprising that while the majority of countries
should prefer the Jagellonian proposal, it was not seriously considered.
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Shapley-Shubik index Banzhaf index
Lisbon Penrose Nice Lisbon Penrose Nice
Austria 2,08% 3,06% 2,80% 2,58% 3,16% 3,09%
Belgium 2,56% 3,56% 3,39% 2,92% 3,63% 3,68%
Bulgaria 1,57% 2,40% 2,80% 2,21% 2,52% 3,09%
Cyprus 0,91% 1,24% 1,09% 1,76% 1,38% 1,25%
Czech Republic 2,17% 3,13% 3,39% 2,63% 3,22% 3,68%
Denmark 1,60% 2,49% 1,95% 2,25% 2,60% 2,18%
Estonia 0,89% 1,15% 1,09% 1,74% 1,29% 1,25%
Finland 1,52% 2,38% 1,95% 2,20% 2,50% 2,18%
France 12,47% 8,89% 8,75% 9,91% 8,41% 7,78%
Germany 12,72% 8,82% 8,75% 9,79% 8,35% 7,78%
Greece 2,42% 3,38% 3,39% 2,80% 3,46% 3,68%
Hungary 2,05% 3,00% 3,39% 2,55% 3,10% 3,68%
Ireland 1,72% 2,65% 1,95% 2,35% 2,77% 2,18%
Italy 10,20% 8,02% 8,70% 8,54% 7,66% 7,78%
Latvia 0,97% 1,39% 1,09% 1,81% 1,52% 1,25%
Lithuania 1,10% 1,67% 1,95% 1,89% 1,81% 2,18%
Luxembourg 0,82% 0,96% 1,09% 1,70% 1,10% 1,25%
Malta 0,78% 0,75% 0,81% 1,67% 0,89% 0,94%
Netherlands 3,28% 4,13% 3,67% 3,36% 4,16% 3,97%
Poland 5,53% 5,69% 7,98% 4,28% 5,60% 7,42%
Portugal 2,44% 3,41% 3,39% 2,82% 3,49% 3,68%
Romania 3,43% 4,17% 3,98% 3,39% 4,20% 4,26%
Slovakia 1,42% 2,19% 1,95% 2,10% 2,32% 2,18%
Slovenia 0,98% 1,41% 1,09% 1,82% 1,55% 1,25%
Spain 8,61% 7,46% 8,05% 7,68% 7,18% 7,42%
Sweden 2,34% 3,35% 2,80% 2,78% 3,43% 3,09%
United Kingdom 13,40% 9,23% 8,75% 10,48% 8,69% 7,78%
Table 3: Projected power in 2060: Lisbon rules in comparison with the Penrose square-rule
and the Nice status quo.
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3. Methods
3.1. Power index approach
When we study power we really study the countries’ ability to alter deci-
sions. We focus on a priori measures of voting power, that is, voting power
before the issues to be voted on or the voters’ positions on these issues are
known. This simplification overlooks the aligned preferences of some mem-
ber states (Kaniovski and Leech, 2009, provides a more general model), but
considering that the actual votes cast are not made public only speculation
is possible.
Depending on whether the countries’s objective is to push for a particular
policy change (the I-power, Felsenthal and Machover, 1998, 2004) or simply
to be able to make decisions (P-power) we must use a different power mea-
sure. Since this is not very clear, we study both: we use the Banzhaf-index
(Banzhaf, 1965; Coleman, 1971) to measure I-power and the Shapley-Shubik
index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) for the P-power. Straffin (1977) intro-
duced a probabilistic approach and has shown that the two methods differ
in whether the voters’ probabilities of supporting a motion are independent
or the same. Straffin, Jr. (1988) gives an extensive comparison of the two
approaches even providing examples (with voting in two chambers) where
even the order of players changes when ranked according to power. Here the
differences are not so extreme, the Shapley-Shubik index sees large players
comparatively more powerful.
3.2. Data
Already in the Nice rules populations are mentioned as a condition for a
coalition to be winning, but in the Lisbon rules populations take the leading
role to determine a country’s influence in voting. In our estimates of voting
power we use the population forecasts of Eurostat, the statistical institute
of the European Union. “Eurostat’s population projections is one of sev-
eral possible population change scenarios based on assumptions for fertility,
mortality and migration. The method used for population projections is the
“cohort-component” method” (Eurostat, 2009) that divides the population
into age-sex cohorts and accounts for the fertility, mortality, and migration
behaviour of each of these cohorts. (George et al., 2004)
The forecasts are available for every 5 years between 2010 and 2060 and
are shown in Table 2.
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3.3. Software
The calculations are made using Indices of Power (IOP) 2.0 (Bra¨uninger
and Ko¨nig, 2005). Indices of Power is a well-established, trusted program
that calculates various power indices and measures including the Shapley-
Shubik index and the normalised Banzhaf measure for a broad class of
weighted voting situations with several criteria and at most 10 chambers
and 50 actors in each. As such it is a natural if not the only candidate to
calculate power indices in complex voting situations.
Originally written to handle weighted voting where the main roles have
been played by the voting weights, normally small integers so Indices of
Power cannot handle large weights such as populations. As a compromise
population data are entered in 100000’s that may have a minor effect on the
indices found.
Shapley-Shubik index Normalised Banzhaf value
2010 2015 2020 2060 2010 2015 2020 2060
Bulgaria 2,81 1,81 1,79 1,57 3,09 2,40 2,34 2,21
France 8,71 11,17 11,20 12,47 7,78 8,98 9,17 9,91
Germany 8,76 15,04 15,12 12,72 7,78 11,31 10,98 9,79
Hungary 3,40 2,21 2,20 2,05 3,68 2,71 2,67 2,55
Lithuania 1,95 1,19 1,18 1,10 2,18 1,92 1,90 1,89
Malta 0,81 0,75 0,75 0,78 0,94 1,57 1,57 1,67
Poland 7,99 6,52 6,53 5,53 7,42 5,35 5,05 4,28
U. K. 8,71 11,09 11,11 13,40 7,78 8,93 9,26 10,48
decisiveness 2,03 12,80 12,70 12,71
Table 4: Power indices for selected countries in selected years
4. Results
We are interested in three effects. Firstly, whether and to what extent
are the new voting rules able to improve the EU’s decisiveness. As Hosli
(2008) observed and discussed in detail, the days when the EU could make
decisions by unanimity are over. Second, we want to see a better equity
among European citizens. Finally any change will have winners and losers.
We are also interested in the “dynamic equity” the possible loss of acquired
rights.
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Note that our results have been obtained with the usual limitations in-
herent to a priori measures of voting power and focus solely on the voting
power in the Council of Ministers. One must note that the decisions are often
made with unanimity and there are clearly countries that are agenda setters
that may lead to a higher share of the power. We have knowingly ignored
possible new entries as we want to study the effect of the new voting rules
rather than the effects of the entry.
4.1. Improved decisiveness
The results for the calculations are summarised in Table 4 for selected
years and selected countries – for the complete dataset see Tables A.6 and
A.7. Most importantly we can see that the probability of decisiveness has
increased dramatically. While in the Nice system about 1 out of 50 coalitions
of countries could approve a decision, under the new system this increases
to more than 1 out of 8.4 Naturally, the best period is between 2014 and
2017, when either of the rules can be applied to approve a decision. The
gain, however, is rather small. There are in total 227 − 1 or over 134 million
possible coalitions among the 27 member states, of which only about 2500
are decisive under the old, but not under the new rules. This seems like a
fair price to abandon a complicated system.
4.2. On representation
The increased decisiveness on the other hand means that there are many
(millions) of additional coalitions that are now winning. Not all members
benefit from these changes equally. One of the criticisms of the old system
was the enormous differences between the influence of an individual citizen
depending on his citizenship. While this is hardly avoidable in such a complex
situation, the severity of the problem is striking. Citizens of Luxembourg
or Malta have about 20 times as much influence as citizens of Germany.
Interestingly the two former members are also the largest recipients of EU
funds on a per capita basis (European Parliament, 2010). Has this improved?
Before we can answer this question, we must decide on the benchmark:
what would be the fair allocation of power? Penrose (1946) has in his already
mentioned result established the Penrose square-root rule, stating that the
4For a reference point note that in a simple majority setting a coalition or its comple-
menter has the majority of the votes and so the ratio is 1 to 2.
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voting weights should be proportional to the square root of the populations.
We have presented the power in this benchmark scenario as well as the pre-
and post-reform powers in Table 3. It is apparent that the new power distri-
bution is further from the ideal. Taking the (unweighted quadratic) average
difference as a measure of distance, the Lisbon rules are 2 (Banzhaf index)
to 7 (Shapley-Subik index) times less equal.
1
2
5
10
2
5
Normalised Banzhaf index
2010
2015
2060
1
2
5
10
2
5
Shapley-Shubik index
Figure 1: Representation before and after the reform: 10−9 times the probability that
a member state is decisive on behalf of a particular citizen (note the logarithmic scale).
Countries in decreasing order of 2010 representativeness from Germany to Luxembourg.
One could say that the Penrose square rule is politically unacceptable and
so it is also interesting to see a comparison with another benchmark, where
we want to have power to be proportional to the populations. So let us see
how the reform fares with respect to this benchmark that the decision makers
may have used, when representativeness is measured by the probability that
a member states makes a decision on behalf of a particular citizen. Here
the conclusions are somewhat different when studying the Shapley-Shubik
(Table A.6) or normalised Banzhaf indices (Tables A.7). Looking at the
first in Figure 1, we find that the overall changes are very favourable: the
representation of Germany dramatically improves, and although Malta’s does
not decrease much, Maltese citizens will have only about 10 times as much
influence as the citizens of a larger country. Medium sized countries are clear
losers compared to the status quo, but as a result the top 20 countries are very
similarly represented with less than a factor of 1.8 in representativeness. In
the case of the Banzhaf index, yet again, Germany’s representation improves
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much, overtaking France, Poland and the UK, too, but smaller countries
become better represented, so that by 2060 Maltese citizens have over 30
times the influence of their British peers. It could well be that we talk
about some outliers. Unfortunately this is not the case: the (unweighted
quadratic) average distance from equal representation more than doubles for
the Banzhaf index.
Shapley-Shubik Banzhaf
reform pop. total reform pop. total
U. K. 27% 21% 54% Malta 67% 6% 77%
Germany 72% -15% 45% Slovenia 42% 3% 45%
France 28% 12% 43% Latvia 43% 1% 45%
Italy 21% -3% 17% Cyprus 30% 8% 41%
. . . . . . . . . . . . Estonia 34% 4% 39%
Luxembourg -30% 7% -25% Luxembourg 26% 8% 36%
Austria -29% 4% -26% U. K. 15% 17% 35%
Portugal -23% -6% -27% France 15% 10% 27%
Slovakia -31% 4% -28% Germany 45% -13% 26%
Greece -28% -1% -29% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poland -18% -15% -31% Greece -22% -3% -24%
Czech Rep. -33% -5% -36% Bulgaria -22% -8% -29%
Hungary -35% -7% -40% Czech Rep. -25% -5% -29%
Lithuania -39% -8% -44% Hungary -26% -6% -31%
Bulgaria -36% -13% -44% Poland -28% -20% -42%
Table 5: The most drastic relative changes in the power indices. (The effect of the popu-
lation change refers to the period until 2060.)
This is hardly surprising. Firstly note that the power κi of a player can
be expressed as a weighted average of her power or contribution µi in the
winning coalitions (Ko´czy, 2008).
κi =
∑
C∈2N\∅
aCµCi (1)
where
∑
C∈2N\∅ a
C = 1.
Within a coalition the contributions µi are treated equally by the two
measures, what differs are the weights aC . For the Shapley-Shubik index
aCφ =
(|C| − 1)!kC(n− |C|)!
n!
. (2)
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while for the Banzhaf index
aCβ =
kC∑
C∈W k
C
. (3)
where kC is the number of critical players in coalition C.
The difference in the indices is most pronounced for large coalitions.
When such a large coalition is a minimal winning coalition, it contains many
small members, each of which are critical. Large coalitions get a high weight
for Shapley-Shubik, and a coalition with many critical players gets a high
weight for Banzhaf. On the other hand, a large surplus coalition has a few
critical large voters: the weight of the coalition is still large for Shapley-
Shubik, but due to the fewer critical players, (much) smaller for Banzhaf.
Under the Nice rules the number and population of voters rarely mattered
and voting was decided based on the voting weights. Voting weights repre-
sented a compromise between size and number: in the new system this is not
necessary. When a coalition lacks population, a large voter can help a lot.
Similarly, when the population is there, but the coalition is not sufficiently
inclusive, even the smallest member states are useful, in fact equally useful as
the bigger ones. Medium sized voters turn out to be not much more needed
than small voters, while a lot less useful as the big ones. On the other hand
the weighting method of the two measures explains why are large players who
benefit from the reform most according to the Shapley-Shubik index, while
according to the Banzhaf measure small member states gain even more.
4.3. Winners and losers
As long as we are interested in shares of voting power, any change will
benefit some member countries and harm others. Who the winners and losers
are depends on the details of the change (Baldwin and Widgre´n, 2004). In
the following we look at the effects of the voting reform.
The changes we have so far discussed are due to the change in the voting
system, but also due to population changes. Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania
lose around a quarter of their population, the UK gains that much, while
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Ireland are predicted to gain more than 50% of
theirs. The effect of the new system, observable at the 2015 values is drastic
for the largest countries, Germany gaining nearly 80%, while some middle-
sized countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania lose the most 35-40% of their
power for the Shapley-Shubik index. If we look at the normalised Banzhaf,
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the largest and the smallest countries gain, the biggest losses are recorded for
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic. Overall the same countries, together
with Bulgaria lose the most power. While Poland and the Czech Republic
were among the last ones, interestingly Hungary was the first one to ratify the
treaty, it took her no more than 9 days and less than an hour of discussion.
Arguably these changes are not due to the reform, but to unfavourable
demographic changes. This may be true, but before the reform the popula-
tions rarely mattered and the population forecasts were known at the time
of signing the treaty.
Finally we make two observations. Firstly, the effects are sometimes just
the opposite for Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Luxembourg is an ex-
ample that loses according to Shapley-Shubik, but wins according to Banzhaf.
Estonia is a country with a slowly but steadily decreasing population, yet its
Banzhaf power has the opposite trend.
Second, it is interesting to note, how certain groups of countries benefit
more than others. The biggest losers of the reform are all recipients from the
budget. Based on the Shapley-Shubik indices the share of the biggest per
capita recipients goes down from 40% to 28%, the major contributors gain
power from 29% to 35%. Looking at other groups, we find that the 4 largest
countries presently having about a third of the influence increase their share
to nearly half. Central and East European Countries (the Visegra´d countries
together with Romania and Bulgaria) presently decide about 1 in 4 decisions.
By 2060 this share goes down to 1 in 6 looking at the current trends.
5. Conclusions
One of the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon was to reform the slow, in-
creasingly impotent decision making of the European Union. This task was
completed with success making it about 6 times easier to reach a decision.
The changes were also made with the intention to make the decision making
more fair, allowing all European citizens to have the same influence on the
decision making. Here the success was more moderate halving the past in-
equalities even if we look at the Shapley-Shubik index, while the normalised
Banzhaf value reports a worsening of the situation.
The changes do not affect all countries equally. The large countries dom-
inate European politics – the rules of the Lisbon Treaty have been mediated
by Germany. The base+prop method of the Cambridge Compromise (Grim-
mett, 2011) favours the largest and the smallest member states. Here, too,
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the large countries are clear beneficiaries of the changes: the mechanisms
to limit their influence have been mostly removed. The countries that suf-
fer most from the changes are surprisingly not the smallest ones, but the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where a combination of the reform
together with unfavourable demographic changes mean that in 50 years they
will have much less influence than what they have today.
Appendix A. Tables
2010 2015 2020 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Austria 2,81 1,99 1,98 1,98 2,02 2,04 2,05 2,06 2,07 2,08
Belgium 3,40 2,38 2,37 2,38 2,44 2,47 2,49 2,52 2,55 2,56
Bulgaria 2,81 1,81 1,79 1,75 1,70 1,66 1,63 1,61 1,59 1,57
Cyprus 1,10 0,82 0,82 0,83 0,85 0,86 0,88 0,88 0,90 0,91
Czech Republic 3,40 2,29 2,28 2,26 2,24 2,22 2,22 2,20 2,19 2,17
Denmark 1,95 1,54 1,53 1,53 1,55 1,57 1,57 1,58 1,59 1,60
Estonia 1,10 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,88 0,87 0,88 0,88 0,89 0,89
Finland 1,95 1,51 1,50 1,50 1,52 1,52 1,51 1,52 1,51 1,52
France 8,71 11,17 11,20 11,31 11,60 11,77 11,95 12,11 12,28 12,47
Germany 8,76 15,04 15,12 14,79 14,23 13,95 13,64 13,32 13,03 12,72
Greece 3,40 2,44 2,43 2,43 2,42 2,42 2,43 2,43 2,43 2,42
Hungary 3,40 2,21 2,20 2,17 2,13 2,10 2,09 2,07 2,07 2,05
Ireland 1,95 1,46 1,45 1,49 1,56 1,60 1,62 1,65 1,68 1,72
Italy 8,70 10,53 10,54 10,49 10,40 10,38 10,36 10,33 10,28 10,20
Latvia 1,10 1,01 1,01 1,01 0,99 0,99 0,98 0,98 0,98 0,97
Lithuania 1,95 1,19 1,18 1,16 1,15 1,13 1,12 1,12 1,11 1,10
Luxembourg 1,10 0,77 0,76 0,77 0,78 0,78 0,80 0,81 0,81 0,82
Malta 0,81 0,75 0,75 0,74 0,75 0,75 0,76 0,76 0,77 0,78
Netherlands 3,67 3,26 3,27 3,28 3,32 3,33 3,32 3,32 3,30 3,28
Poland 7,99 6,52 6,53 6,45 6,21 6,06 5,92 5,80 5,67 5,53
Portugal 3,40 2,35 2,34 2,35 2,38 2,39 2,42 2,43 2,43 2,44
Romania 3,98 3,97 4,01 3,93 3,77 3,71 3,65 3,58 3,50 3,43
Slovakia 1,95 1,51 1,50 1,49 1,47 1,46 1,45 1,44 1,44 1,42
Slovenia 1,10 1,00 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,99 0,98 0,99 0,98
Spain 8,04 8,35 8,34 8,51 8,61 8,62 8,64 8,65 8,64 8,61
Sweden 2,81 2,14 2,13 2,17 2,22 2,24 2,26 2,29 2,31 2,34
UK 8,71 11,09 11,11 11,33 11,84 12,12 12,38 12,68 13,03 13,40
Table A.6: Shapley-Shubik indices of the member countries (in %)
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2010 2015 2020 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Austria 3,09 2,55 2,56 2,57 2,58 2,57 2,58 2,58 2,58 2,58
Belgium 3,68 2,84 2,86 2,87 2,89 2,89 2,90 2,90 2,90 2,92
Bulgaria 3,09 2,40 2,34 2,32 2,29 2,27 2,25 2,23 2,22 2,21
Cyprus 1,25 1,63 1,65 1,67 1,68 1,70 1,72 1,74 1,75 1,76
Czech Republic 3,68 2,77 2,75 2,73 2,71 2,69 2,67 2,66 2,64 2,63
Denmark 2,18 2,19 2,19 2,21 2,22 2,22 2,23 2,23 2,24 2,25
Estonia 1,25 1,68 1,68 1,69 1,69 1,70 1,72 1,73 1,74 1,74
Finland 2,18 2,17 2,17 2,18 2,18 2,18 2,18 2,18 2,19 2,20
France 7,78 8,98 9,17 9,28 9,39 9,51 9,61 9,71 9,81 9,91
Germany 7,78 11,31 10,98 10,82 10,65 10,47 10,29 10,13 9,95 9,79
Greece 3,68 2,89 2,87 2,86 2,85 2,85 2,83 2,82 2,81 2,80
Hungary 3,68 2,71 2,67 2,65 2,62 2,61 2,59 2,58 2,56 2,55
Ireland 2,18 2,13 2,19 2,22 2,24 2,26 2,28 2,30 2,33 2,35
Italy 7,78 8,56 8,55 8,55 8,58 8,60 8,62 8,61 8,59 8,54
Latvia 1,25 1,78 1,77 1,77 1,78 1,78 1,79 1,79 1,79 1,81
Lithuania 2,18 1,92 1,90 1,90 1,89 1,89 1,89 1,89 1,89 1,89
Luxembourg 1,25 1,58 1,60 1,61 1,62 1,65 1,66 1,67 1,69 1,70
Malta 0,94 1,57 1,57 1,59 1,60 1,61 1,63 1,64 1,65 1,67
Netherlands 3,97 3,51 3,51 3,50 3,48 3,45 3,43 3,39 3,37 3,36
Poland 7,42 5,35 5,05 4,91 4,76 4,61 4,49 4,39 4,32 4,28
Portugal 3,68 2,82 2,83 2,83 2,83 2,84 2,83 2,82 2,82 2,82
Romania 4,26 4,04 3,91 3,82 3,74 3,67 3,60 3,52 3,46 3,39
Slovakia 2,18 2,17 2,16 2,15 2,14 2,13 2,13 2,13 2,11 2,10
Slovenia 1,25 1,77 1,76 1,77 1,78 1,79 1,79 1,80 1,80 1,82
Spain 7,42 7,10 7,36 7,42 7,49 7,56 7,63 7,68 7,71 7,68
Sweden 3,09 2,66 2,70 2,72 2,72 2,73 2,74 2,75 2,76 2,78
UK 7,78 8,93 9,26 9,43 9,61 9,76 9,94 10,13 10,31 10,48
decisiveness 2,03 12,80 12,70 12,71 12,69 12,69 12,69 12,67 12,67 12,71
Table A.7: The normalised Banzhaf indices and the decisiveness (in %)
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Figure 2: Cartogram showing the relative change in Shapley-Shubik indices. The area of
each country is scaled by the relative change of power. Darker shades indicate a higher
ratio. Note that the areas of Poland and Germany should be similar or that Bulgaria
should be Latvia twice.
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